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1 Introduction
What is the scope for tax rate reductions if the government receives a given amount of
non-tax revenues or cut in expenditures? In more technical terms: What is the trade-oﬀ
between a specific tax rate and a given change in non-tax net revenues implied by the
government budget constraint, when one takes general equilibrium eﬀects into account?
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on this question. Not surprisingly, it’s motivating
claim is that a naive estimate, obtained by dividing the additional revenue by the base of
the tax that is to be reduced, is likely to be quite misleading, and for some reasons that
to my knowledge has not been given due attention in the literature.
It is easy to motivate the introductory question for economies in which the govern-
ment collects the revenue from natural resources. A good example is Norway where the
government collects most of the petroleum rent through taxes and stakes in petroleum
companies. The fiscal policy rule adopted in 2001 imposes a precise constraint on the
non-petroleum government budget deficit. This constraint has, however, been violated in
most years, and the high oil price after 2004 has reinforced the pressure from various in-
terest groups for tax cuts and higher goverment spending. The response to this pressure
should rest on a thorough analysis of the introductory question. However, the relevance
of this analysis should be quite general. For example, most governments in the OECD are
indebted, and a permanent fall in the expected interest rate or revaluations of government
assets will be equivalent to an increase in resource rents. Other examples include changes
in world prices of imports used for government consumption, productivity improvements in
the production of public services and demographic changes aﬀecting government pension
expenditures and tax financed health and social care.
This paper will focus on one particular general equilibrium mechanism: Changes in
government non-tax net revenues aﬀect the real exchange rate, through e.g. wage ad-
justment, which influences tax bases and prices of government spending. I examine this
mechanism analytically within a stylized model, and it’s empirical significance by simula-
tions on an applied general equilibrium model. Some of the analytical results are perhaps
surprising. For example, it is possible that an increase in non-tax revenue warrants an
increase in the tax rates. This result is not due to labour supply responses. Instead, I
emphasize that wage adjustment automatically distributes a significant a portion of the
additional non-tax revenues from the government to households, reducing the scope for
discretionary redistribution through lower tax rates and/or increased government spend-
ing. To my knowledge this mechanism has not been given the attention it deserves in the
literature on tax incidence and fiscal sustainability.
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The fiscal eﬀect of wage adjustments can be summarized in the case where the gov-
ernment receives more of a traded good, e.g. oil revenues. Additional oil revenue allows an
increase in net imports of other traded goods, restoring balanced trade. As is well known1,
resources are reallocated from production of traded goods to the non-traded goods sec-
tor, through real appreciation brought about by a higher wage rate and/or exchange rate
appreciation. The contribution in this paper is to deduce the fiscal consequences of the
wage adjustment, especially the price eﬀects on government expenditures and tax bases.
A higher wage rate raises the current value of tax bases and government expenditures.
Depending on the relative wage content, expenditures may increase more than the tax
bases, thereby reducing the scope for cuts in the tax rates. This possibility is more likely
the higher is the wage dependency of government expenditures. The wage share in gov-
ernment consumption is typically very large, and public pensions and other transfers are
indexed to the wage rate in several countries.
Another result in this paper is that the direction of the fiscal eﬀect of the wage adjust-
ment depends on whether the government receives more of a traded good or a non-traded
good. Assuming labour to be internationally immobile, one example of the latter case
is productivity improvement in public service production, reducing the government em-
ployment required to meet political targets. In this case the wage rate adjustment will
contribute to reinforce the revenue neutral tax rate reduction if the increase in non-tax
government revenues comes in form of a non-traded good.
The scope for wage rate adjustments depends on the technologies in the industries
producing tradeables. The standard textbook model of the small open economy (SOE),
assumes constant returns to scale. Then the wage rate and other prices of non-traded
factors are determined by the exogenous world prices and exogenous productivity para-
meters in the most profitable traded goods industries. When these variables are fixed, the
scope for wage rate adjustments is limited to incidence of changes in the taxes on labour
paid by the producers, such as the payroll tax. However, if technologies exhibit decreasing
returns the scope for wage rate adjustments is greater. Decreasing returns at the industry
level is consistent with empirical findings in several economies. This is particularly true
for economies that have specialized their composition of the T-sector to comparative ad-
vantages based on natural resources. Specifically, the main T-sectors in Norway have been
based on natural resources, such as crude oil, natural gas, hydro power, fish stocks, forests
and certain minerals. Expanding the use of natural resources typically runs into decreasing
returns. Section 3.1 provides further justification of assuming decreasing returns to scale
in Norwegian industries.
1See e.g. Corden and Neary (1982), van Wijnbergen (1984) and Krugman (1987).
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The literature on the basic determinants of the tax burden has grown rapidly as a result
of the strong concern for the problems of fiscal sustainability (FS) caused by ageing facing
most of the industrial countries.2 However, the fiscal eﬀect of wage rate adjustments has
rarely been discussed in this literature. Exceptions are the projections of the fiscal position
in Denmark and Norway discussed in, respevctively, Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2004)
and Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006) (HHSS). Both papers find that policy makers
cannot rely on productivity growth in the private sector as a source to finance the increase
in government expenditure, since the resulting wage growth raises expenditures more than
the tax bases. HHSS also emphasize how the wage eﬀect modifies the scope for tax rate
reductions when government petroleum revnues increases. However, neither of the papers
oﬀer the precise formal analysis provided in the present paper.
The situation where the government receives less of a traded good is given a normative
analysis in Steigum and Thøgersen (2003) (ST). ST consider the optimal dynamic fiscal
policy response to an unanticipated drop in the price of a natural resource, when the
government itself loses revenue from this adverse shock. As pointed out by ST, relatively
few studies take into account that the government itself has stakes in the sectors hit by
external shocks. ST include non-traded goods in their model, which in principle allows for a
wage eﬀect on the government budget through endogenous real exchange rate adjustments.
However, the specifications of government revenues and expenditures in the ST-model
are too simple to capture fiscal eﬀects of wage adjustments. Buiter (1988) includes an
analyis of how a lump-sum tax must adjust to exogenous changes in the world interest
rate and internal or external government debt in order to balance the government budget.
Aggregating all taxes and transfers into a lump-sum tax removes a priori the wage eﬀect on
these budget components, but Buiter’s results are influenced by an endogenous wage eﬀect
on government spending on non-traded goods. However, this wage eﬀect is not pointed
out explicitly. Macklem (1993) uses a dynamic CGE model of the Canadian economy
to analyse macroeconomic aﬀects and tax rate adjustments to an exogenous increase in
government debt. However, his model implies that any changes in the real exchange rate
are transitory. Consequently, his model is not designed to capture the wage eﬀect discussed
in the present paper. All papers referred to above have used intertemporal models, but the
nature of the wage eﬀect adressed in the present paper is most eﬃciently explained within
2Long run projections of the the tax burden in the largest European economies are found in Chauveau
and Loufir (1995), OECD (1998, 2000, 2001), the European Commission (2001), McMorrow and Roeger
(2002) and Visco (2002). Kotlikoﬀ, Smetters and Walliser (2001), Kotlikoﬀ (2001) and Feldstein (2005)
project the fiscal gap in the US. Beetsma, Bettendorf and Broer (2003) and Bovenberg and Knaap (2005)
project the tax burden in the Netherlands. Similar projections for Denmark and Norway are found in,
respectively, Andersen, Jensen and Pedersen (2004) and Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006).
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a static model. The simulation experiments take dynamics into account, but dynamic
aspects play no noteworthy role for the empirical importance of the wage eﬀect.
In analyses of the marginal cost of public funds (MCF) a key question is the increase in
a specific tax rate necessary to bring about a given increase in government revenues. The
MCF literature has focused on endogenous responses in the tax bases to such a policy shift,
in particular the labour supply responses. However, this literature has to my knowledge
not paid attention to the wage eﬀect analysed in the present paper, despite it’s obvious
relevance for the magnitude of the necessary increase in a distortionary tax rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up a theoretical model,
which is stripped down to the minimum ingredients necessary to explain the fiscal eﬀect
of endogenous wage adjustment. Comparative statics results show how the wage rate
diminshes or reinforces the revenue neutral tax rate reduction depending on the nature
of the increase in non-tax government revenue. Section 3 shows that the wage eﬀect is
empirically significant by running relevant simulation experiments on a realistic general
equilibrium model of a particular economy. Specificially, I employ a large scale CGE model
of the Norwegian economy to estimate the revenue neutral reduction of the payroll tax
rate when the government non-tax revenue increases by an exogenous amount. I consider
an increase in the world prices of oil and gas as an example of an increase in the form
of a traded good, and reduced government employment as an example of an increase in
form of a non-traded good. Among the conclusions drawn in Section 4, I emphasize the
relevance of relatively detailed CGE models for assessing the fiscal trade-oﬀs between non-
tax revenues and revenue neutral tax rate adjustments, since the fiscal eﬀects of general
equilibrium repercussions are likely to be highly country specific.
2 Analytical results
2.1 A stylized model
We consider a model of a small open economy producing one Traded (T) and one Non-
traded (N) good. The model is static, so there are no savings. Households are represented
by a consumer who consumes the N-good and the T-good.3 The world price is exogenous
and normalised to unity. So is the fixed nominal exchange rate, as it has no real eﬀects.
The government produces a given level of services by using labour. It finances the wage
costs by collecting taxing on labour income, profits and consumption. In addition, the
3 It is straightforward to let the good produced by the T-sector diﬀer from the traded good purchased
by the consumer.
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government owns an exogenous endowment of a tradable, possibly diﬀerent from the other
goods.
A key property of the model is decreasing returns to scale, giving rise to a contin-
uous negative relationship between the supply of the T-good and the wage rate, which
is equivalent to the real exchange rate in this model. In order to show how endogenous
wage rate adjustments aﬀects the tax rate required to balance the government budget,
it suﬃces to have decreasing returns in the T-sector, whereas the N-sector produces at
constant returns. Also, assuming exogenous labour supply makes the model much simpler
without losing the main points.
The model consists of the following 9 equations:
XT = L
s
T (1)
CN = LN (2)
LT =
 s
W
 1
1−s (3)
πT = (1− s)XT (4)
PN =W (5)
(1 + tC) (CI + PNCN) = (1− tL)WL+ (1− tπ)πT (6)
tL =
WLG − tC (CI + PNCN)− tππT −O
WL
(7)
CI
CN
= PσN (8)
LT + LN + LG = L (9)
XT is output of the traded good, which equals exports of the T-good. CN denotes
output and consumption of the non-traded good. L is total employment, LG, LT and LN
is employment in, respectively, the government sector, the T- and the N-sector. PT is the
world price facing the exporting T-sector, and PN is the price of the N-good. 0 < s < 1
is the elasticity of scale in the T-sector. W is the wage rate paid by producers, i.e. the
pre-tax consumer wage rate. πT is profits in the T-sector. CI is consumption of the traded
good, which equals imports. σ is the elasticity of substitution between imports and N-
goods in the CES utility function of the representative consumer. O is the value of the
exogenous amount of another tradable owned by the government, denominated in terms
of the imported consumer good. tL, tC and tπ are, respectively, the tax rates on labour
income, consumption and profits.
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(1) is the decreasing returns to scale production function of the T-sector. (2) is a
constant returns to scale production function of the N-sector, assuming equilibrium in
the market for the N-good. Productivity parameters are normalised to unity. (3) is the
labour demand function in the T-sector derived from profit maximization of price taking
firms. (4) is the maximum profit in the T-sector. (5) follows from perfect competition in
the N-sector. (6) is the budget constraint of the representative consumer, and (7) is the
government budget constraint. We shall let tL be the fiscal instrument that endogenously
adjusts to meet this constraint. (8) is the first order condition for utility maximization,
reflecting a uniform consumption tax rate levied both on imports and the N-good, and
that the share parameters in the CES utility function are normalised to unity. The (fixed)
level of services produced by the government sector has no eﬀect on the demand functions
for imports and the N-good. (9) is the labour market equilibrium condition.
O, L, LG, tπ, tC and PT = 1 are exogenous. The model determines the 9 endogenous
variables XT , LT , πT , LN , PN , W , CN , CI and tL. We shall examine how changes in O
and LG aﬀect tL, with particular focus on the influence from equilibrium adjustments in
W . As will be shown below, W is independent of the tax rates. It is therefore convenient
to proceed in two steps. First, we establish the equilibrium relationships ∂W∂O and
∂W
∂LG .
Thereafter we examine ∂tL∂O and
∂tL
∂LG .
Although the model is very simple, flexible interpretation of the variables extends
the relevance of the conclusions. First, O may be interpreted as the value of property
rights of natural resources such as oil and/or predetermined financial claims on the rest
of the world. O may be negative, e.g. if the government sector uses imports to produce
services or is indebted to foreigners. Second, it is easy to include wage indexed transfers,
e.g. public pension benefits, from the government to the consumer. To see this, let N be
the exogenous number of transfer resipients and let b the exogenous individual benefit
ex ante wage indexation. WbN should be added to consumer income and to government
expenditure. Government expenditures then equalsW (LG + bN), which plays exactly the
same role as WLG in the model above.
The equilibrium wage rate is implicitly found by substitutions into the labour market
equilibrium condition, using (3), LN = CN = W−σCI , that the two budget constraints
implies the the external balance constraint CI = XT +O, and XT =

s
W
 s
1−s :
 s
W
 1
1−s
+W−σ
 s
W
 s
1−s
+O

= L−LG, (10)
which is independent of the tax rates since labour supply is exogenous. Define the
initial share variables λL = LL−LG , λi =
Li
L−LG , i = T,N,G , δO =
O
CI
and δT = XTCI .
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Logarithmic diﬀerentiation of (10) yields the equilibrium adjustment in the wage rate, see
Appendix 1:
Wˆ =
λGLˆG + λNδOOˆ
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
, (11)
where Wˆ ≡ dWW etc. The denominator, henceforth denoted lW > 0, is the absolute
value of the aggregate labour demand elasticity with respect to W . W is proportional
to simultaneous equal relative changes in PT and O (reflecting that the model does not
determine the nominal price level). WˆO =
λNδO
lW
> 0, since a higher O is equivalent to
improved terms of trade, which allows an expansion of consumption and a contraction of
the T-sector. WˆLG =
λG
lW
> 0. The intuition is that the supply of labour to the private
sector increases. Higher private sector employment raises privat consumption of both the
N-good and imports. Balanced trade is restored by a fall in W , expanding exports and
reducing the import share. When s→ 1 or σ → ∞, then lW → ∞ , and WˆO and WˆLG → 0,
since the model then converges to the textbook model of the small open economy in which
there are constant returns and imports are perfect substitutes for home goods. Given W ,
the solution for the other endogenous variables are recursively found.
2.2 The government receives more tradeables
The revenue neutral adjustment of tL to a marginal change in O , which takes into account
the dependency between W and O, follows from derivation of (7) (see Appendix 1):
∂tL
∂O =
−1 + ∂W∂O
k
LG − tLL− tC

1 + σWσ−1

CN +

Wσ−1+1
1−s

LT

+ tπLT
l
WL
(12)
The bracket contains the government budget eﬀects of a change in the wage rate: LG
captures the change in the government wage bill, tLL captures the change in the base of
labour income taxation, tπLT captures the change in the profit tax base, and the terms
multiplied by tC are diﬀerent sources to changes in the consumption tax base. Here tCCN
captures the consumption tax base eﬀect due to the isolated change in the price of the N-
good, tCσWσ−1CN = tCσCIW captures the change in the taxes collected from consumption
of imports attributable to the change in the import share, and tC

Wσ−1 + 1
 
1
1−s

LT =
− tC (Wσ +W ) ∂LT∂W = tC (Wσ +W )
∂CN
∂W captures the change in the consumption tax
base caused by a proportional change in CN and CI . An alternative expression follows by
inserting the government budget constraint into (12) (see Appendix 1):
∂tL
∂O =
−1 + WˆOO
k
tC (1− σ)CI +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT +O
l
WL
. (13)
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where θN ≡ PNCNPNCN+CI is the budget share of the home good in private consumption, and
WˆO ≡ ∂W∂O
O
W =
λN δO
lW
> 0.
In order to build up an understanding of the model in general, and of (13) in particular,
it is instructive to examine some simple special cases.
2.2.1 Special cases
O = tC = tπ = 0 initially. Now ∂tL∂O degenerates to
∂tL
∂O

O=tC=tπ=0
=
−1
WL
. (14)
Note that since the general equilibrium eﬀects captured by ∂W∂O are irrelevant in this
case, the correct estimate of ∂tL∂O coincides with a naive estimate ignoring all equilibrium
eﬀects. In this case the initial government budget constraint simplifies to tL = WLGWL =
LG
L . Since both government revenues and expenditures are proportional to W the wage
adjustment induced by a marginal change from in O from 0 has no eﬀect on the necessary
change in tL.
O > 0, tC = tπ = 0 initially. Now a marginal increase in O implies that tL must be
changed by
∂tL
∂O

tC=tπ=0
=
−1 + WˆO
WL
> − 1
WL
(15)
since WˆO > 0. To get the intuition behind this modification of the scope for tax
rate reduction, recall that the government budget constraint in this special case is O =
W (LG − tLL) > 0, i.e. the wage dependent expenditures exceed the wage dependent
revenues. Consequently, the real appreciation through the rise in W magnifies the non-oil
budget government deficit.
This intuition suggests that ∂tL∂O

tC=tπ=0
is monotonically increasing from − 1WL when
O increases from 0. Inspection of WˆO =
λN δO
lW
= δO(1−s)
σ(1−s)+ LT
LN
+δT s
confirms this. Intuitively,
the higher is O the smaller is the T-sector necessary to keep trade balanced. Thus, a higher
O implies a higher δO and a smaller δT . In addition λTλN would be smaller. Both eﬀects
make WˆO an increasing function in O, cet. par.
Is it possible that ∂tL∂O

tC=tπ=0
> 0? This requires WˆO > 1 ⇔ δO > lWλN . Recall that
WˆO → 0 when σ → ∞ and/or s→ 1, because lW → ∞. Thus, for WˆO to be non-negligible,
imports must be rather diﬀerent from the N-good, and the marginal labour productivity in
the T-sector must be significantly reduced when LT increases. A precise characterization
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is possible in the extreme case when the oil revenue is large enough to pay for all imports,
i.e. when δO = 1, δT = 0 and λN = 1. Then lWλN = σ +
LT
LN
+δT s
1−s degenerates to σ. When
there is no T-sector, the wage rate aﬀects net exports through import substitution. Thus,
in the case where tC = tπ = 0, if σ < 1 and δO = λN = 1, then WˆO > 1, and additional
government oil revenues would require an increase in the labour income tax rate in order
to restore the government budget constraint!
Reducing the initial O from the extreme situation when δO = λN = 1 would increase
the initial values of δT and LT from zero. Cet. par. this reduces the diﬀerence δO − lWλN =
δO −

σ +
LT
LN
+δT s
1−s

. To keep the diﬀerence - and thereby WˆO - constant, would require
a reduction in σ and/or an increase in s towards unity.
The general insights from the discussion above can be summarized in the following
points:
1. For a given size of the T-sector, the more price elastic is import demand and T-good
supply, i.e. the higher are σ and s.
2. For given σ and s, the scope for reducing the labour income tax as a revenue neutral
response to higher government oil revenues, is greater the higher is the share of
imports financed by exports of T-goods rather than oil exports.
3. It is the adverse budget eﬀect of a higher wage rate that becomes more significant
the smaller are σ, s and the initial size of the T-sector (relative to import demand).
Accounting for other taxes. When tC = 0 but tπ 9= 0, the government budget
constraint takes the form W (LG − tLL) = tππT +O > 0. Thus, if the revenue from profit
taxation has been used to finance a higher wage dependent expenditures (here represented
by LG) or a lower tL initially, for given L and O, the scope for tax rate reduction is further
reduced when O increases. Alternatively, if profit taxes is used to finance a reduction in O,
for example by lower taxes on the resource rent, ∂tL∂O

tC=0
= ∂tL∂O

tC=tπ=0
, since the fiscal
eﬀect of the wage rate adjustment is the same.
Like the other taxes, tC does not aﬀect WˆO. But the counteracting eﬀect of higher wage
rate on the scope for reducing tL is diminishing in the tC . Note that the influence ofW on
the consumption tax base must be read from (12), not from (13), which is obtained after
using the government budget constraint to eliminate wage dependent budget components.
The change in the consumption tax base equals ∂(CI+PNCN )∂W = CN+σWσ−1CN+Wσ
∂CN
∂W +
W ∂CN∂W . Recall that the terms here, successively, capture the price eﬀect on the consumption
tax base, the increase in taxed consumption of imports for a given CN , the increase in taxed
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consumption of imports for a given import share, and the increase in taxed consumption
of the N-good for a given N-good price. All these eﬀects are positive.(Specifically, ∂CN∂W =
−∂LT∂W =
LT
(1−s)W > 0.) Consequently, when the increase in O induces real appreciation
through an increase in W , the government collects more revenue from the consumption
tax. This eﬀect contributes to magnify the scope for reducing the labour income tax rate,
and is is stronger the higher is tC . The magnification also increases with σ and s. The
higher is σ, the greater is the increase in taxed imports for a increase in the wage rate.
The closer s is to unity, the stronger is the export contraction of a given increase in W ,
and the assumption of full employment implies that the lost exports is replaced by taxed
consumption of N-goods. For suﬃciently large values of tC , σ and/or s close to unity, the
bracketed factor multiplied with WˆO in (12) or (13) may even be negative, in which case
the positive general equilibrium eﬀect on W exacerbates the scope for reducing tL.
2.3 The government receives more non-tradeables
We consider the case where the government gets more of some resources that can replace
labour in the production of public services, i.e. LG can be reduced without reducing the
supply of (the unspecified) public services. This shift may result from for example increased
productivity in the government sector or improved health in the population, reducing the
need for resources on public health services. LG may also be interpreted as including
the recipients of wage indexed transfers, which may decrease due to changes in norms
etc. Anyhow, the supply of labour to the private sector increases, at the same time as
government expenditure falls.
Appendix 1 shows that the revenue neutral adjustment of tL to a marginal change in
LG , taking into account the dependency between W and LG, can be written
∂tL
∂LG
=
W +
WˆLG
LG
k
tC (1− σ)CI +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT +O
l
WL
, (16)
where WˆLG =
λG
lW
> 0. The bracketed term is identical to the one (13). As above, the
naive estimate, ignoring all general equilibrium eﬀects, will be correct if tC = tπ = 0 ⇔
LG = tLL initially. When the bracketed term is positive, the wage rate adjustment now
reinforces the direct budget eﬀect of changing LG. This is contrary to the case in which
the government gets more of the traded good, i.e. an increase in O. The similarity between
(16) and (13) makes further analysis of ∂tL∂LG an unnecessary repetition of the results above.
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3 Empirical importance
3.1 A CGE model of the Norwegian economy
Realistic estimates of the empirical significance of the influence of wage rate adjustments
on the relationship between the tax rate and government endowments require simulations
on a CGE model of a specific economy. My conjecture is that the relevance of an empirical
model may be even greater for the question analysed in this paper than for many other
problems in the applied literature on taxation. Two points support this view: 1) The
analysis above has verified that the initial composition of the government revenues and
expenditures is crucial for the magnitude of the fiscal eﬀect of the wage rate adjustment.
This composition is highly country specific. Norway is probably an extreme case due to the
large government petroleum revenues. 2) The magnitude of the wage rate adjustment is also
likely to diﬀer substantially between economies, due to e.g. diﬀerent institutional settings
for the wage formation. The same is likely to be true for relevant industry characteristics,
for example the scale elasticities of the production functions emphasized in the previous
section.
This section presents results from simulations on a large dynamic CGE model, MSG6,
of the Norwegian economy. The structure and empirical properties are described and
explained in Heide, Holmøy, Lerskau and Solli (2004). Here we confine the description
to the characteristics most important for our analysis.
MSG6 shares some basic characteristics with the stylized model above, which makes
the analysis in the the previous section relevant for understanding the simulation results
presented below: The nominal exchange rate and all world prices of exports and imports are
exogenous; labour is internationally immobile; all goods, services and production factors
are perfectly mobile between industries within the economy; supply equals demand in
all markets in all periods; a representative consumer maximizes utility, and producers
maximize the value of firms; agents consider imports of manufactures and services as close
but imperfect substitutes for the corresponding deliveries from Norwegian firms, which
implies that import shares are decreasing functions of the import price relative to the
price index of corresponding domestic deliveries; the balanced trade constraint is met by
the consumption possibilities are constrained by endogenous wage adjustment ensuring
profitability in a suﬃciently large production of traded goods. The model is closed by
letting endogenous payroll tax rate adjustment balance the government budget.
In order to serve as a realistic description of how the Norwegian economy works in the
long run, MSG6 is much more complex than the stylized model in several respects:
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1. MSG6 provides a rather disaggregated description of the Norwegian economy, spec-
ifying 60 commodity groups.
2. MSG6 is dynamic; the consumer maximizes an intertemporal utility function, and
producers maximize the present value of the net-of-tax cash flow to the owners.
Agents have access to the international credit market, and the world interest rate is
exogenous to the Norwegian economy. Consumers and producers have perfect fore-
sight. The balanced trade constraint takes the form of a non-Ponzi game condition
on net foreign debt.
3. MSG6 takes into account that firms employ goods as intermediaries and capital
goods in addition to labour.
4. Individual labour supply is endogenous, with the uncompensated wage elasticity
equal to 0.1.
5. Producers of manufactures and tradable services allocate their output between the
domestic and the foreign market. It is costly to change the output composition
between these markets. Whereas domestic firms are price takers in all factor markets
and the export markets, they participate in Large Group Monopolistic Competition
with free entry/exit in the domestic markets.
6. Whereas only the production function in the T-sector exhibits decreasing returns
to scale in the stylized model, all private industry production functions have this
property in MSG6. The scale elasticities range from 0.85 - 1.00.
Since the scale elasticity is a key determinant of the scope for wage rate adjustments, it
is important to support it with empirical evidence. Klette (1999) estimates scale elasticities
close to 0.9 for Norwegian manufacturing firms. On the other hand, Biorn, Lindquist and
Skjerpen (2002) find constant or moderately increasing returns to scale for the average
plant in Norwegian manufacturing. However, increasing returns at the plant level may be
compatible with decreasing returns at the aggregate industry level when there are capacity
constraints for each plant and significant cost heterogeneity among the plants within
the same industry. This logic was explored in the pioneering work on the correspondence
between micro and macro production functions by Houthakker (1955-56), Johansen (1959,
1972) and Salter (1960). Bye, Holmøy and Heide (2006) shows that decreasing returns
to scale at the industry level for the the most export oriented Norwegian manufacturing
industries results from productivity heterogeneity, combined with profit based exit of firms.
Large and persistent productivity diﬀerences even within narrowly defined industries have
been well documented, see e.g. Sutton (1997), Baily, Hulten and Campbell (1992) and
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Klette (1999). MSG6 takes into account that output and input in an industry can change
both because of changes at the firm level and as a result of entry or exit of firms, which
diﬀer with respect to productivity within the same industry.
Decreasing returns to scale also represents an answer to the challenge to applied model
builders advanced by Kehoe (2003). Kehoe evaluates the performances of three promi-
nent multisectoral CGE models in estimating the impact of NAFTA on the economies of
Canada, Mexico and the US. He concludes that these models drastically underestimated
the impact on North American trade, and that they failed to capture most of the relative
impacts on diﬀerent sectors. Partly, he attributes the poor performance to the modelling
approach based on the Dixit-Stiglitz specification of preferences over home goods and im-
ports. Instead, he suggests that a Ricardian model specification, emphasizing productivity
heterogeneity within the specified industries, will do a better job.
Three growth scenarios are compared:
1. A baseline scenario assuming prolongation of the present fiscal and welfare policy,
including present tax rates in real terms, the present public pension system and other
welfare schemes, and wage indexation of most cash transfers from the government
to households. See Heide, Holmøy, Solli and Strøm (2006) for more details.
2. A high petroleum price scenario resting on the baseline assumptions except that the
real world prices of crude oil and natural gas are twice as high as in the baseline, i.e.
the real oil price increases from 25 to 50 $/barrel, and the gas price follows the oil
price. This is a highly relevant illustration of the case where the government gets more
tradeables, since the Norwegian government collects most of the petroleum revenues
through taxation and direct state ownership. Petroleum revenues amounted to 34.5
percent of total government revenues in 2005.4 We disregard any repercussions on
other world markets and increases in the oil and gas production.
3. A reduction of government employment caused by higher productivity growth with-
out changing the output of services from the baseline. This illustrates the case where
the government gets more non-tradeables.
In all scenarios the fiscal policy rule adopted in 2001 is followed. Strictly, this rule
implies that the annual government petroleum revenue is transferred to the Government
Pension Fund - Global (GPFG), and that only an estimated real return of 4 percent of
the fund can be used to finance the non-petroleum budget deficit. In order to meet the
4According to the Revised National Budget 2006, St.meld. nr. 2, Norwegian Ministry of Finance.
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meet the resulting time path of the government budget surplus, the payroll tax rate adjusts
annually. The payroll tax rate, rather than the tax rate on personal labour income is chosen
as the endogenous fiscal instrument, because it is a very broad tax and flat tax on labour
income, whereas the personal income tax system is much more complex. However, since
the payroll tax is levied on producers rather than workers, it has some eﬀects not captured
in the formal analysis above. These eﬀects are identified formally in Appendix 2. They are
not qualitatively important in the case of higher petroleum prices. Their importance for
the results of reducing government employment will be commented below.
3.2 Higher petroleum prices
Accounting for unit costs of petroleum production, doubling the petroleums prices implies
a 140 percent increase in the government petroleum wealth, computed as the present value
of the government net cash flow from the petroleum sector over the period 2004-2050. This
increase corresponds to 72 percent of the present value over the same period of government
old-age pension expenditures. Whereas the payroll tax rate increases from the present 13 to
31 percent along the baseline scenario, doubling of petroleum prices allows for a reduction
in this tax rate by 13-14 percentage points, so that it passes 17 percent in 2050.
The empirical significance of the influence of general equilibrium eﬀects on the payroll
tax rate reduction is best demonstrated by comparing it with a naive direct estimate. In
2050 the GPFG capital would be 160 percent higher with a real oil price of 50 $/barrel than
in the baseline scenario. The fiscal policy rule allows the non-petroleum budget deficit to
equal 4 percent of the GPFG capital. The eﬀective base of the payroll tax is the payroll in
the private sector. One obtains a naive estimate of the reduction of the payroll tax rate by
dividing the 4 percent of the increase in the GPFG capital by the payroll in the baseline
scenario. In 2050 such a naive estimate would imply a 26 percentage points reduction
from the baseline level of 31 percent. In contrast the corresponding model based estimate
is a reduction of 14 percentage points, roughly half of the naive estimate. Thus, general
equilibrium eﬀects do not generate only slight modifications, they change the order of
magnitude of the fiscal eﬀects.
The by far most important general equilibrium eﬀect is the eﬀect of wage rate ad-
justments discussed in Section 2. The terms-of-trade gain allows a real appreciation cor-
responding to a 16 percent increase in the wage cost per hour in 2050 relative to the
non-petroleum world prices. The corresponding increase in the wage rate equals 28.9 per-
cent as most of the cut in the payroll tax rate is passed over to labour. The increased
wage rate is the main reason why the revenue from direct taxes increases by 4.1 percent
in 2050 despite the reduction of employment and the payroll tax rate. The increase in the
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labour cost also raises the tax bases of indirect taxes through mark-up pricing of domestic
deliveries. About 14 points of the 24.9 percent increase in the indirect tax revenue can be
attributed to higher prices.
Table 1. Long run macroeconomic eﬀects in Norway of 1) a permanent
doubling of the real petroleum prices and 2) reduced real spending on govern-
ment Health and Social Care (Labour productivity). Deviations in 2050 from
the baseline scenario. Percent unless otherwise stated.
Petroleum prices Labour productivity
Pay roll tax, percentage points -14.0 -4.5
Total revenues, of which 28.6 -3.0
Indirect taxes 24.9 1.9
Direct taxes, excl. petroleum revenues 4.1 -5.2
Total expenditures, of which 21.0 -3.2
Government consumption 27.9 3.4
Cash transfers to households 15.4 -10.4
Private consumption 10.2 2.7
Employment -1.3 -0.3
Government employment 0 -8.4
Wage cost per hour 16.0 -2.0
Wage rate 28.9 2.6
Consumer real wage rate 13.6 3.1
However, due to the current spending of the petroleum wealth allowed by the fiscal
policy rule, government expenditures increase more than government revenues. Wage in-
dexed government pension expenditures account for more than 60 percent of the increase
in expenditures. Moreover, the government wage bill increases, given the assumption that
competition in the labour market spreads the wage growth throughout the economy, in-
cluding the government sectors. The main reason why the percentage increase in the
government consumption is only slightly more than half the increase in transfers, is the
reduction in the payroll tax rate. However, this obviously reflects an equal drop in the
payroll tax revenue from government employment.
The results demonstrate that wage indexation, as well as the spread of wage growth
from the main producers of traded goods to other sectors, represent two important channels
through which increased higher government wealth automatically is rebated to households.
This automatic rebatement significantly reduces the room for tax rate reductions.
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The terms-of-trade gain allows for an expansion of private consumption, which signif-
icantly reinforces the tax rate reduction as the indirect consumption tax rate is close to
20 percent in Norway. In 2050 private consumption in fixed prices would be 10.2 percent
above the baseline scenario. The formal analysis in Section 2 ruled out by assumption
fiscal eﬀects of endogenous labour supply responses. The simulation shows that employ-
ment falls, which reduces most tax bases. However, the employment reduction is rather
small, 1.3 percent in 2050. The result reflects that households experience an increase in
non-labour income, which weakly dominates the positive labour supply eﬀect of the large
increase in the consumer real wage rate.
3.3 Reduced government employment
Accelerating labour productivity in the government sector Health and social care from
0.5 to 1.0 percent per year from 2006 to 2050 accumulates to an 8.4 percent reduction
of total government employment in 2050. Ignoring any other adjustments, this will also
equal the percentage decrease in the government labour cost. Even a naive estimate would
take into account that the labour cost include the payroll tax rate, which should be netted
out as a payment from the government to itself. In 2050 the baseline average payroll tax
rate has increased from 13 percent in 2005 to 31 percent. In addition, we subtract the
35 percent average tax on personal labour income in order to obtain the direct eﬀective
budget eﬀect of reduced government employment. This implies a direct budget eﬀect in
2050 which is about 14 percent of the direct budget eﬀect of doubling the prices of oil and
gas. Consequently, since the payroll tax is a flat tax, a naive estimate on the scope for
reducing the payroll tax rate is 0.14*26 = 3.6 percentage points.
The corresponding model based estimate is a 4.5 percent reduction. Thus, the simu-
lation result is consistent with the analytical result derived in the previous section: The
general equilibrium fiscal eﬀect of the wage rate adjustment will magnify the scope for tax
rate reductions when the government gets more revenue in terms of a non-traded good.
However, this conclusion needs qualifications since other equilibrium eﬀects also influence
the payroll tax rate reduction, especially as the diﬀerence between the model based and
the naive estimates is only 0.9 percentage points.
First, one may question that the wage eﬀect magnifies the tax rate reduction since the
wage rate increases (by 2.6 percent) in the simulation, whereas it falls in the theoretical
analysis. Recall, however, that the theoretical analysis considered adjustments of the tax
rate levied on personal labour income - not the payroll tax rate. The simulated reduction
of the unit labour cost (2 percent) is consistent with the theoretical analysis, and the
payroll tax rate reduction makes it possible to combine lower labour cost with a higher
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consumer wage rate. Appendix 2 shows that the sign of the wage eﬀect on the payroll tax
rate reduction is determined by the sign of the change in the labour cost. It also shows
that the magnitude - but not the sign - of the necessary adjustment of the payroll tax
rate will be somewhat magnified compared to the corresponding adjustment of the labour
income tax rate.
In addition to the price eﬀects of the wage rate adjustement, two other general equi-
librium eﬀects are worth mentioning: 1) the use of other inputs in the government sector
Health and Social Care is reduced by the same proportion as employment, but the spending
eﬀect is only 5 percent of the reduced labour costs. 2) The increase in private consumption
raises the indirect tax revenue, as well as government income from market sales of services.
This revenue eﬀect is modified by the decrease in consumer prices entailed by the fall in
unit labour costs. These eﬀects dominate the negative tax base eﬀect caused by the slight
reduction of total employment. The small labour supply reduction reflects that the eﬀect
of the increase in real non-labour income weakly dominates the substitution eﬀect of the
3.1 percent increase in the consumer real wage rate. Note that the reason why the decrease
in government consumption exceeds the 8.4 percent drop in government employment is
basically due to the decrease in the unit labour cost driven by the payroll tax rate reduc-
tion. As pointed out above, this is a gross eﬀect, which also explains most of the reduction
of 5.2 percent in the revenues from direct taxes.
4 Conclusions
This paper has tried to answer the question: What is the scope for tax rate reductions
when the government experiences an exogenous increase in non-tax revenues or cut in
expenditures? To this end it has clarified the trade-oﬀ between a tax rate levied on labour
income and non-tax net revenues implied by the government budget constraint, when
one takes into account general equilibrium eﬀects of a given change in non-tax revenues.
The analysis has paid particular attention to the fiscal eﬀects of the general equilibrium
adjustment of the wage rate, which represents the real exchange rate. The main eﬀects were
highlighted in a stylized general equilibrium model of a small open economy, which deviates
from the textbook model by allowing decreasing returns to scale in the sector producing
tradeables. Simulations on a large scale empirical CGE model of the Norwegian economy
confirm the qualitative theoretical results, and estimates the empirical fiscal significance
of the wage rate adjustment and other general equilibrium eﬀects. The analysis justifies
the following conclusions:
1. The scope for a revenue neutral tax rate reduction as a response to an increase in
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non-tax revenues may be significantly aﬀected by the endogenous wage rate adjust-
ment. This is strikingly demonstrated by the CGE estimate on the payroll tax rate
reduction in Norway of doubling the world prices of oil and gas. Whereas a naive
estimate, ignoring all equilibrium eﬀects, is a 26 percentage points reduction in 2050,
the CGE estimate is 14 points.
2. A general insight is that wage rate adjustments represent an automatic channel for
redistributing changes in non-tax government net revenues. The potential impor-
tance of this redistribution mechanism is especially high in economies similar to
the so-called "Scandinavian Model", characterised by relatively strong egalitarian
norms. Specifically, the impact of a change in the wage rate on government expen-
ditures is relatively strong in such economies for two reasons. First, a relatively high
degree of centralised wage formation ensures that wage changes are to a large ex-
tent and relatively rapidly spread to the government sectors. Second, the relatively
generous public pension benefits and most other government transfers to households
are indexed to the average wage level. Depending on the wage formation and the
composition of the government budget with respect to wage dependent revenue and
expenditure components, this automatic redistribution mechanism may diminish or
magnify the revenue neutral tax rate reduction.
3. The fiscal eﬀect of the wage rate adjustment depends on the nature of non-tax rev-
enue that changes. If the government gets more revenue in the form of a tradable, the
wage rate will increase, which diminishes the revenue neutral tax rate reduction, pro-
vided that the initial wage dependent government expenditures exceed wage depen-
dent government revenues. On the other hand, the wage rate adjustment reinforces
the revenue neutral tax rate reduction when the government gets more non-tax net
revenue in the form a non-tradable, e.g. decrease in the government employment re-
quired to produce a given output of services. Such a shift induces a drop in the wage
rate, which, cet. par, increases the budget surplus when the initial wage dependent
government expenditures exceed wage dependent government revenues.
4. Since the strength of the fiscal eﬀect of wage rate adjustments is likely to diﬀer signif-
icantly between countries and over time, because it depends on both the magnitude
of the change in the wage rate, and the initial wage dependent government net rev-
enues. Norway is a special case, particularly because of large government petroleum
revenues. Given the present fiscal policy rule for the intertemporal consumption of
the petroleum wealth, the petroleum revenues allow a substantial deficit of wage
dependent government net revenues. Moreover, the wage dispersion is relatively low
and constant, the government employed as much as 27 percent of total man-hours in
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2005, and government welfare transfers are generous and indexed to wages. In coun-
tries where both the government and the economy as a whole must serve substantial
debt, wage dependent government net revenues may be positive. In addition to the
direct positive budget eﬀect of a drop in the interest rate, the increase in the wage
rate compatible with the external balance constraint will in this case magnify the
direct eﬀect. Hence, the present analysis is relevant for other countries as well.
The magnitude of the changes in the wage rate depends crucially on the degree of
decreasing returns to scale in the traded goods sector. In my opinion empirical evidence
suggest that this is a realistic assumption at the aggregate industry level. It also meets
the criticism raised in Kehoe (2003) against alternative applied modelling approaches of
exports and imports.
Since the fiscal eﬀects of general equilibrium repercussions are likely to be highly coun-
try specific, relevant CGE models seem to be the appropriate tool for assessing the fiscal
trade-oﬀs between non-tax revenues and revenue neutral tax rate adjustments. Probably,
model based estimates will also be more respected by the public than more simple es-
timates, despite some loss of transparency. In light of both the possible magnitudes of
the general equilibrium eﬀects, and the unpopular fiscal policy decisions facing ageing
economies, it seems important to provide such a common understanding of the country
specific fiscal trade-oﬀs.
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Appendix 1: Calculating the partial derivatives of tL
Recall the reduced form of the labour market equilibrium condition determining W ,
(10):  s
W
 1
1−s
+W−σ
 s
W
 s
1−s
+O

= L−LG,
which is independent of the tax rates since labour supply is exogenous. Let λL = LL−LG
and λi = LiL−LG , i = T,N,G, i.e. the shares of labour in the private sector absorbed by
the T-, N- and the the government sector, respectively. δO = OCI and δT =
XT
CI
are the
shares of, respectively, the oil revenue and the value of the traded goods output in the
consumer imports. Logarithmic diﬀerentiation of (10) (in the initial equilibrium) yields
the equilibrium adjustment in the wage rate
Wˆ =

λT+λN δT
1−s

PˆT − λLLˆ+ λGLˆG + λNδOOˆ
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
(17)
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where Wˆ ≡ dWW etc. The partial elasticities become
WˆO =
λNδO
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
, (18)
WˆLG =
λG
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
. (19)
tL follows from one of the budget constraints:
tL =
WLG −O − tC (CI + PNCN)− tππT
WL
(20)
When calculating the partial derivatives of tL we take into account that the change
in W aﬀects the tax bases as follows: CI = WσCN ⇒ ∂CI∂W = σWσ−1CN +Wσ
∂CN
∂W . It
follows from (9) that ∂CN∂W =
∂LN
∂W = −
∂LT
∂W . (3) implies
∂LT
∂W = −

1
1−s

LT
W . Consequently,
∂CN
∂W =

1
1−s

LT
W . Moreover,
∂πT
∂W = −LT . Derivation of (20) with respect to O yields:
∂tL
∂O =
WL
k
∂W
∂O LG − 1− tπ
∂πT
∂W
∂W
∂O − tC
∂(CI+WCN )
∂W
∂W
∂O
l
− tLWL∂W∂O L
(WL)2
=
−1 + ∂W∂O
k
LG − tLL− tπ ∂πT∂W − tC

∂CI
∂W +
∂(WCN )
∂W
l
WL
=
−1 + ∂W∂O
k
LG − tLL+ tπLT − tCCN − tC

σWσ−1CN +

Wσ−1+1
1−s

LT
l
WL
The bracket contains the government budget eﬀects of a change in the wage rate: LG
captures the change in the government wage bill, tLL captures the change in the base of
labour income taxation, tπLT captures the change in the profit tax base, tCCN captures
the consumption tax base eﬀect due to the isolated change in the price of the N-good,
tCσWσ−1CN = tCσCIW captures the change in the taxes collected from consumption of
imports attributable to the change in the import share, and tC

Wσ−1 + 1
 
1
1−s

LT = −
tC (W
σ +W ) ∂LT∂W = tC (W
σ +W ) ∂CN∂W captures the change in the consumption tax base
caused by a proportional change in CN and CI .
We obtain an alternative expression for ∂tL∂O by inserting WˆO ≡
∂W
∂O
O
W , using that the
government budget constraint implies that W (LG − tLL− tCCN) = tCCI + tππT + O,
πT = XT −WLT , and that WLT = sXT when profit is maximized:
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∂tL
∂O =
−1 + ∂W∂O
k
LG − tLL− tCCN + tπLT − tC

σWσ−1CN +

Wσ−1+1
1−s

LT
l
WL
−1 + ∂W∂O
1
W
k
tCCI + tππT +O + tπWLT − tC

σWσCN +

Wσ+W
1−s

LT
l
WL
=
−1 + WˆOO
k
tCCI + tπXT +O − tC
k
σWσCN +

Wσ−1 + 1
 
WLT
1−s
ll
WL
=
−1 + WˆOO
k
tCCI + tπXT +O − tC
k
σCI +

CI
PNCN
+ 1

WLT
1−s
ll
WL
=
−1 + WˆOO
k
tCCI + tπXT +O − tC
k
σCI +

CI+PNCN
PNCN

sXT
1−s
ll
WL
=
−1 + WˆOO
k
tC (1− σ)CI +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT +O
l
WL
. (21)
where θN ≡ PNCNPNCN+CI is the budget share of the home good in private consumption.
After the similar manipulations we obtain the partial derivation of tL with respect to.
LG, recognizing the dependency between W and LG:
∂tL
∂LG
=
WL
k
∂W
∂LGLG +W − tπ
∂πT
∂W
∂W
∂LG − tC
∂(CI+WCN )
∂W
∂W
∂LG
l
− tlWL ∂W∂LGL
(WL)2
=
W +
k
LG − tlL− tπ ∂πT∂W − tC

∂CI
∂W +
∂(WCN )
∂W
l
∂W
∂LG
WL
=
W + ∂W∂LG
k
LG − tlL− tCCN + tπLT − tC

σWσ−1CN +

Wσ−1+1
1−s

LT
l
WL
=
W +
WˆLG
LG
k
tC (1− σ)CI +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT +O
l
WL
. (22)
Appendix 2: Changes in the payroll tax rate
Let a be the payroll tax rate, and define the unit labour cost as Z = (1 + a)W . Z plays
plays the same role asW in the model in Section 2. Thus, the solutions for all endogenous
variables but tL are identical to the solutions of that model and independent of the tax
rates. The solution for Z follows from appropriate substitutions into the labour market
equilibrium condition:
 s
Z
 1
1−s
+ Z−σ
 s
Z
 s
1−s
+O

= L− LG. (23)
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Logarithmic diﬀerentiation with respect to O and LG and Z yields:
Zˆ =
λGLˆG + λNδOOˆ
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
. (24)
So the partial elasticities become
ZˆO =
λNδO
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
> 0, (25)
ZˆLG =
λG
λNσ + λT+λN δT s1−s
> 0. (26)
The government budget constraint can be written as
(1− tL)WLG = tC (CI + PNCN ) + tππT + (tL + a)W (LT + LN) +O⇔
WLG − tLWLG = tC (CI + ZCN) + tππT + (tL + a)WL− tLWLG − aWLG +O⇔
ZLG = tC (CI + ZCN) + tππT +

tL + a
1 + a

ZL+O⇔
tL + a
1 + a
= Y ≡ ZLG −O − tC (CI + ZCN)− tππT
ZL
. (27)
The eﬀects on a or tLof changes in O and LG goes through the auxiliary variable Y ,
which is independent of the choice of the endogenous fiscal instrument.
We diﬀerentiate the expression for Y with respect to Y , Z, LG and O, using that
the government budget constraint may be written as tC (CI + ZCN ) + tππT + O =
Z (LG − Y L)⇔ Z (LG − Y L− tCCN ) = tCCI + tππT +O:
dY =
dLG
L
−
ZL
k
tC

∂CI
∂Z +
∂(ZCN )
∂Z

dZ + tπ
∂πT
∂Z dZ + dO
l
− ZL (LG − Y L) dZ
(ZL)2
=
ZdLG − dO
ZL
+
LG − Y L− tC

∂CI
∂Z +
∂(ZCN )
∂Z

− tπ ∂πT∂Z
ZL
dZ
=
ZdLG − dO
ZL
+
LG − Y L+ tπLT − tCCN − tC

σZσ−1CN +

Zσ−1+1
1−s

LT

ZL
dZ
=
ZdLG − dO
ZL
+
Z (LG − Y L+ tπLT − tCCN)− tC

σZσCN +

Zσ+Z
1−s

LT

ZL
dZ
Z
=
ZdLG − dO
ZL
+
tCCI + tπ (πT + ZLT ) +O − tC

σCI +

CI+ZCN
ZCN

ZLT
1−s

ZL
dZ
Z
=
ZdLG − dO
ZL
+
tC (1− σ)CI +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT +O
ZL
dZ
Z
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Thus, ∂Y∂O and
∂Y
∂LG become
∂Y
∂O =
−1 + ZˆOO
k
tC (1− σ)CI +O +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT
l
ZL
, (28)
∂Y
∂LG
=
Z +
ZˆLG
LG
k
tC (1− σ)CI +O +

tπ − tCθN
s
1−s

XT
l
ZL
, (29)
which are analogous to ∂tL∂O and
∂tL
∂LG above. Having found the impact on Y , the adjustment
of a follows from
tL + a
1 + a
= Y ⇔ a = Y − tL
1− Y ,
which implies
∂a
∂Y =
(1 + a)2
1− tL
. (30)
Alternatively, when tL is the endogenous fiscal instrument:
tL + a
1 + a
= Y ⇔ tL = Y (1 + a)− a⇒
∂tL
∂Y = 1+ a
Thus, the necessary adjustment of a magnifies the adjustment in Y by the factor (1+a)
2
1−tL ,
which is 1+a1−tL > 1 times the corresponding eﬀect on tL.
Appendix 3: The model determines the real exchange rate
This appendix demonstrates that all real variables, including the endogenous tax rate,
is invariant to proportional changes in the wage rate and the nominal exchange rate. For
completeness, we take into account imports used by the government, IG, and we allow
the imported good to diﬀer from the exported one. The world prices PI and PT are
now measured in foreign currency. For expositional simplicity we consider the case where
tC = tπ = 0. Thus, it verifies the conventional insight that the general equilibrium model
determines relative prices and real variables, leaving one degree of freedom for nominal
prices.
The model consists of the following 8 equations:
XT = L
s
T (31)
LT =

sePT
W
 1
1−s
(32)
PN =W (33)
CI
CN
=

ePI
PN
−σ
(34)
ePICI + PNCN = (1− tL) (ePTXT + PNXN +WLG) (35)
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WLG + ePIIG = tL (ePTXT + PNXN +WLG) + eO (36)
XN = CN (37)
LT + LN + LG = L (38)
Adding the two budget constraints, and using XN = CN , yields the national budget
constraint:
ePICI + ePIIG = eO + ePTXT ⇔
PI (CI + IG) = O + PTXT ,
which is independent of e.
A reduced form of the model follows from substitutions into the labour market equi-
librium condition:
L− LG =

sePT
W
 1
1−s
+CN (39)
=

sePT
W
 1
1−s
+

ePI
PN
σ
CI (40)
=

sePT
W
 1
1−s
+

ePI
W
σ
⎡
⎢⎣
PT

sePT
W
 s
1−s
+O
PI
− IG
⎤
⎥⎦ . (41)
This equilibrium condition demonstrates that the model only determines eW , which repre-
sents the real exchange rate. The tax rate will also be invariant to proportional changes
in e and W , since PN =W implies
tL =
WLG + ePIIG − eO
ePTXT +WXN +WLG
.
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